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Abstract
To develop governance that is both effective
and ethical, scholars study the causes and
effects of unethical behavior as well as the
policies and systems that thwart such
behavior. However, there is much inconsis-
tency and incoherence in the demarcation of
different types of unethical behaviors. To
enable conceptual clarity and improved
measurement we present here a validated
typology of unethical behaviors – that is,
integrity violations. Differentiating between
such types of violations not only reveals
insightful variation in the frequency and
acceptability of these violations but also
shows how leadership styles and organiza-
tional culture have varying effects on these
different unethical behaviors.
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INTRODUCTION
Interest in the integrity and ethics of governance has increased significantly during the
last decades. International organizations have demonstrated a growing commitment to
fight corruption, governments have put it higher on their agendas, politicians and public
servants have demonstrated greater involvement. In contrast, when integrity is under
threat in public organizations, it decreases trust in government and may even lead, as in
the case of Italy in the 1990s, to the implosion of a country’s political system (Della
Porta and Me´ny 1997; Bull and Newell 2003). Within the academic realm the subject
has gained momentum as well (Preston et al. 2002; Lambsdorff 2005; Lewis and
Gilman 2005; Menzel 2005; Cooper 2006; Lawton and Doig 2006; Treisman 2007;
Huberts et al. 2008). Scholars in many fields have entered the study of ethics and
integrity, unethical behavior or integrity violations. Many study the causes and effects of
corruption in countries, others research deviant, unethical or misbehavior in business
and public organizations, or the policies, instruments, and integrity systems that are
meant to counteract such behavior. Indeed, the sheer number and diversity of scholars
and professionals that presented their work at the 2009 Governing Good and Governing
Well: The First Global Dialogue on Ethical and Effective Governance conference is a
tell-tale sign of the strong ethics community that has emerged over the years.
This article builds on the work and creativity of this community of researchers and
practitioners. Our message is simple: while it is encouraging that there is a growing
interest in the field and that more and more efforts are being made to develop
approaches to governance that emphasize both effectiveness and ethics, it is now time to
move forward towards more conceptual and theoretical clarity and it is urgent to invest
in improving the methodology of measuring unethical behavior or ‘integrity violations’
(including corruption). Without such conceptual clarity and robust measurement,
research results will lack the specificity and accuracy that we need to determine the
right balance between different measures for fostering ethics and preventing unethical
conduct. As a result, our well-meant efforts to develop more ethical governance may
not be optimally effective or could even lead to counterproductive outcomes. Our
ambitions concerning conceptual precision and progress in measurement have led to the
development of a typology of integrity violations and a first attempt to validate it for
measurement. This article summarizes these endeavors.
INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS: BEYOND CORRUPTION
Integrity and corruption in practice
In the international arena the fight against corruption has gained strength since the
beginning of the 1990s. Today, ethics and integrity are considered essential to promote
political and economic progress. Indeed, ethics is now considered an integral part of
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good governance. Among the organizations involved in the fight against corruption are
the United Nations (Resolution against Corruption in 1997; Convention in 2005), the
World Bank (with the concept of ‘good governance’), the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD Convention in 1997) as well as civil society
organizations such as the Center for Public Integrity (1989) and Transparency
International (founded in 1993). Almost all of the international initiatives focus on
corruption, often defined as the abuse of office for private gain (Pope 2000). This
includes fraud and theft as well as favoritism and patronage, which make it broader than
strictly corruption as bribing (which always involves a third party, offering or delivering
the private gain). At the same time it excludes many breaches of moral norms and
values that are dominant in current discussions on the ethics and integrity of
government, particularly in the ‘western world’.
Two examples follow: on his first full day in office (21 January 2009), US president
Obama signed executive orders relating to ethics guidelines for staff members of his
administration. What do those guidelines tell us about the unethical behavior this
administration wants to ban? They concentrate on the influence of lobbyists in
Washington, on the ‘revolving doors’ that carry special interest influence in and out of
the Government.1 The orders illustrate the President’s concern with ethics and
integrity, but also suggest that he is more concerned about the danger of other types of
integrity violation than clear-cut fraud and corruption (as bribing): gifts that might
bring up questions of independence, lobbying, connections between industry and
government by job rotation, subtle forms of favoritism, and patronage. Another
example of a ‘real life’ discussion and policy concerning integrity concerned UK
politics in 2009. The integrity scandal concerned the many and varied expenses claims
made by UK Members of Parliament that has engulfed politicians from all parties. Both
examples show that the actual discussion about the ethics and integrity of public
functionaries is about a wide range of actual and supposed violations of the moral
norms and values that matter for politicians and civil servants and goes beyond the
scope of ‘corruption’.
Theory and research
The concept and phenomenon ‘corruption’ is very often central in research and theory
(Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Caiden et al. 2001; Heidenheimer and Johnston
2002; Bull and Newell 2003; Treisman 2007). Many researchers have focused on
macro-level comparative research. Quantitative research boomed after the publication
of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. The general pattern is
that the variable ‘corruption’ is related to a series of macro-variables, including the
wealth, economic growth, inflation, religions, politics, judicial system, and so on, of a
particular country. More recently, the corruption reputation variable is broadened with
data on bribe asking. Treisman (2007: 211) concluded:
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Most factors that predict perceived corruption do not correlate with recently available measures of actual
corruption experiences (based on surveys of business people and citizens that ask whether they have
been expected to pay bribes recently). Reported corruption experiences correlate with lower
development, and possibly with dependence on fuel exports, lower trade openness, and more intrusive
regulations. The subjective data may reflect opinion rather than experience, and future research could
usefully focus on experience-based indicators.
Lacking in this tradition are studies that differentiate between types of integrity
violations other than corruption. This is often also the case in research on the ethics of
government. In public administration and political science, ethics and ethics
management have become more important topics but with some exceptions these
seem to focus more on ethical and moral consciousness, ethical climate, ethical
culture, and so forth, than on what goes wrong (Klockars 1997; Dobel 1999;
Montefiore and Vines 1999; Uhr 1999; Klockars et al. 2000; Fijnaut and Huberts
2002; Bossaert and Demmke 2005; Menzel 2005). While a detailed review of the
literature in this respect is beyond the scope of this article, there clearly is a
discrepancy between what we are studying (with the focus on corruption as the
problem or ethics management in general) and what is the subject of the manifold
ethics and integrity dilemmas and policies in actual (western national, state, regional
and local) government.
From corruption to integrity research
Does the discrepancy between the actual integrity discussions and scandals and the
content of our research matter? We think it does, for a number of reasons (see, for
example, Huberts et al. 2006). The first and most obvious reason is that current
empirical research with its focus on corruption offers a worthwhile but limited view
of unethical conduct, especially within organizations. Differentiation between types of
integrity violations, including corruption, adds to our knowledge of the phenomenon
under study. We need a more extended conceptual framework to understand the
ethical and unethical empirical realities of government and governance.
A second argument has to do with the fact that research and policy agendas include
questions about the causes and consequences of ‘corruption’ and the effectiveness of
‘anti-corruption’ policies. For instance, are patronage and favoritism caused by the
same factors as bribing? Do they have the same effects? And if so, what might be the
causes and consequences of private time misbehavior, fraud, or conflict of interest, and
so on? We expect there will be differences and that organizations or governments may
have to develop specific policies for different types of integrity violations, including
corruption. By differentiating between types of integrity violations, the similarities and
differences in their antecedents and effects become more evident, which in turn
enables more effective integrity policies.
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A third, more practical reason has to do with the country we are working in. In the
Netherlands serious corruption seems rather exceptional. In Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perception Index the country scores in the Top 10 of least corrupt
countries (in 2009 at 6, together with Finland, on a list with 180 countries).2 Other
types of unethical behavior such as conflict of interest through sideline activities, fraud,
and private time misbehavior are less exceptional and therefore more decisive for the
integrity and legitimacy of the political and administrative system.
The fourth and last reason has to do with the normative implications of using an
umbrella concept for a broad range of behaviors. When various forms of misconduct are
all labeled under one heading, they are then all ‘strapped on the operating table’ of just
one type of verdict; misconduct is either ‘corrupt’ or ‘it isn’t’. This can lead to
oversimplification, overgeneralization, and/or immediate condemnation (integritism or
corruptism: Huberts 2005). When we distinguish more clearly between types of
violations, keeping in mind that they also differ in the degree to which they violate basic
moral social norms and values, it could help to prevent falling into that particular trap.
TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS
Key concepts
In research on the integrity of governance, integrity can be defined as the quality of acting in
accordance with relevant moral values, norms, and rules. Integrity is a quality of
individuals (Klockars 1997; Solomon 1999) as well as of organizations (Kaptein and
Wempe 2002). Additionally, ethics can be defined as the collection of values and norms,
functioning as standards or yardsticks for assessing the integrity of one’s conduct
(Benjamin 1990). The moral nature of these values and norms refers to what is judged as
right, just, or good conduct. Values are principles that carry a certain weight in one’s
choice of action (what is good to do, or bad to refrain from doing). Norms indicate morally
correct behavior in certain situation. Values and norms guide action and provide a moral
basis to justify or evaluate what one does and who one is (Lawton 1998; Pollock 1998). It
follows that integrity violations are defined here as violations of the relevant moral values,
norms, and rules. Of course, the abovementioned definitions are contested and result
frommany choices we cannotmake explicit in this article. The crucial term ‘integrity’, for
example, is defined in the literature in many different ways.3 Our choice has been that of
integrity as the quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms and rules.
A next question then is which types of behavior are part of the broad category of
integrity violations. The starting point has been broad and open, including (Lamboo 2005):
1 All types of behavior relevant to the organization: behavior within the
organization; the interaction with external actors (citizens); and private time
behavior as far as it is considered relevant for the organization.
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2 All types of relevant moral norms and values: in laws and rules; in internal codes
and procedures; and the informal norms and values, not written down.
3 Behavior contrary to the organization’s interest but also behavior favoring the
organization but harming relevant social norms and values.
In 1998, Huberts presented a first typology of integrity violations, which focused
specifically on police integrity (Huberts 1998) and draws on more general literature on
corruption (Hoetjes 1982; Caiden 1988; Heidenheimer et al. 1989; Alatas 1990;
Huberts 1992; Benaissa 1993; Punch et al. 1993; Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996), on
power abuse and organized crime (van Duyne 1994) and on the more specific literature
on police ethics and police integrity (Roebuck and Barker 1973; Sherman 1974; Punch
1985; Kolthoff 1994; Kleinig 1996; Ahlf 1997) and policing and human rights
(van Reenen 1997). Research on police investigations of violations (criminal as well as
internal investigations) offered additional information about what in practice was
considered contrary to the existing moral norms, values, and rules. The resulting
typology of integrity violations by the police described nine types (Huberts 1998:
28–30):
1 police corruption (illegal use of organizational power for personal gain, cf.
Sherman 1974: 30);
2 police fraud and theft;
3 dubious promises and gifts;
4 questionable sideline activities and jobs (‘moonlighting’);
5 misuse of (access to) information;
6 discrimination and intimidation (of colleagues, citizens);
7 misuse of power(s) (including misuse for legitimate purposes: noble cause
corruption);
8 waste and abuse of resources;
9 police crime (in private time).
This first typology by Huberts (1998) was later adapted and extended, to include
both police and local government organizations. In the process of improving the
typology, other scientific perspectives and fields of study were compared against the
framework as well (see Lasthuizen 2008 for a more detailed discussion). These fields
included organization sciences, theories of ethics in business and public administration,
and police research, whose researchers use such diverse terms as organizational,
workplace, professional, or employee deviance (Punch 1985; Robinson and Greenberg
1998; Kidwell and Martin 2005); noncompliant behavior (Puffer 1987); antisocial
behavior (Giacalone and Greenberg 1997); organizational misbehavior (Vardi and
Weitz 2004); dysfunctional workplace behavior (Griffin et al. 1998) and (police)
misconduct (e.g. Punch 1996; Lamboo et al. 2002) to describe different types of
integrity violations.
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Table 1 summarizes the resulting typology of integrity violations or forms of public
misconduct. Ten types are distinguished. For every type of integrity violation, more
and less serious forms of behavior can be distinguished (depending on the distance to
the norm and values). For instance fraud and theft (type 3) might concern major
embezzlement as well as small declaration fraud; indecent treatment of colleagues
(type 8) might concern sexual harassment or violence as well as bullying and gossiping.
The typology of integrity violations clearly includes more than corruption, and
incorporates not only unethical conduct related to the performance of duties or
directed at the organization and its members, but also misconduct during private time.
These types of integrity violations are considered to be universal and are thus useful for
describing unethical behavior in almost all (public) organizational contexts.
Table 1: Typology of integrity violations
1. Corruption: bribing
Misuse of (public) power for private gain: asking, offering, accepting bribes
2. Corruption: favoritism (nepotism, cronyism, patronage)
Misuse of authority or position to favor family (nepotism), friends (cronyism), or party (patronage)
3. Fraud and theft of resources
Improper private gain acquired from the organization or from colleagues and citizens, with no
involvement of an external actor
4. Conflict of (private and public) interest through gifts
The interference (or potential interference) of personal interest with the public/organizational interest
because of gifts, services, assets, or promises taken
5. Conflict of (private and public) interest through sideline activities
The interference (or potential interference) of personal interest with the public/organizational interest
because of the jobs or activities practiced outside the organization
6. Improper use of authority
The use of illegal/improper means or methods to achieve organizational goals (sometimes for ‘noble
causes’)
7. Misuse and manipulation of information
The intended or unintended abuse of (access to) information, such as cheating, violation of secrecy
rules, breaching confidentiality of information, or concealing information
8. Indecent treatment of colleagues or citizens and customers
Unacceptable treatment that includes not only discrimination (based on gender, race, or sexual
orientation), intimidation, and sexual harassment but also improper behavior like bullying,
nagging, and gossiping
9. Waste and abuse of organizational resources
Failure to comply with organizational standards and/or improper performance or incorrect/
dysfunctional internal behavior
10. Misconduct in private time
Conduct during private time that harms people’s trust in the (public) organization
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Previous attempts to validate an instrument
Even though many scholars have repeatedly advocated its importance (e.g. Menzel
2005; Lawton and Doig 2006), a broad framework for studying integrity violations that
has been empirically researched and validated is lacking so far. The few (empirical)
studies that do examine deviant workplace behaviors either concentrate on one
particular type of misconduct, such as theft (Hollinger and Clark 1982, 1983;
Greenberg 1990, 1997), aggression (Neuman and Baron 1997), lying (Grover 1997),
or sexual harassment (Gutek 1985), or include a wide range of misconduct with no
systematic categorization or analysis (Trevin˜o et al. 1999; Peterson 2002).
One exception is the empirical work of Robinson and Bennett (1995; Bennett and
Robinson 2000) who in their 1995 study developed a typology of deviant workplace
behaviors using multidimensional scaling techniques. Robinson and Bennett’s results
suggest that deviant workplace behaviors vary along two dimensions – minor versus
serious (severity of deviance) and interpersonal versus organizational (target of
deviance) – which produce four distinct categories into which employee deviance can
fall (Robinson and Bennett 1995: 565). The first is production deviance, behaviors that
violate the formally prescribed norms delineating the minimal quality and the quantity
of work to be accomplished, for instance by intentionally working slowly. The second is
property deviance, those instances in which employees acquire or damage the tangible
property or assets of the work organization without authorization, for example by
stealing from the company (cf. Mangione and Quinn 1974; Hollinger and Clark 1982:
333). The third is political deviance, which refers to engagement in social interaction
that puts other individuals at a personal or political disadvantage, including for example
gossiping about co-workers. The fourth category is personal aggression, that is,
behaving in an aggressive or hostile manner toward other individuals; for instance,
being verbally abusive.
In a subsequent study, Bennett and Robinson (2000: 349–50) seek to validate these
categories of employee deviance as different behavioral families; that is, as clusters of
deviant behaviors having similar characteristics and similar antecedents, which may be
functional substitutes in that they serve the same goals. After extensive validation tests,
they produce two final scales: the interpersonal and the organization deviance scale
(Bennett and Robinson 2000: 360), which they argue are different clusters or families
representing two qualitatively different forms of deviance. Both families contain serious
as well as minor forms, which can be seen as a quantitative distinction rather than one
reflecting different types (or families) of deviance (Bennett and Robinson 2000: 350).
Nevertheless, the authors recognize that the study is limited by the inclusion in the scale
of only the more common (rather than all) forms of employee deviance across
organizational contexts and occupations and the elimination of items with low variance
and low inter-item correlations (to ensure reliability). This did lead to the exclusion of
many interesting forms of employee deviance because they were either more serious or
less common. In contrast, the typology proposed in the present article includes both the
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more serious and less common forms of integrity violations. In the following, this latter
typology is empirically validated using data from the Lasthuizen (2008) study on
leadership and integrity in a Dutch police force.
THE RESEARCH PROJECT
Measurement
To validate the integrity violation typology empirically, sixty-four manifestations of
integrity violations were included in the questionnaire in a section labeled ‘Incidents in the
Workplace’. The starting point for the exact wording was the KPMG Integrity
Thermometer, which has also been administered in several regional police forces.4
Drawing on the secondary analysis of this latter dataset, a number of specific manifestations
were selected to measure both the moral judgment (i.e. acceptability) and the observed
frequency of the integrity violations that fit the developed typology. That is, for each
manifestation, the survey included an item on the observed frequency of the violation and
one on the employee’s moral judgment, measured by the acceptability of the violation.
The incidence and prevalence of integrity violations (observed frequency) was assessed by
asking respondents how often they had observed specific integrity violations in their work
unit over the last 12 months, while moral judgment (acceptability) was assessed by asking
respondents to indicate how acceptable they found these behaviors.
Among the presented manifestations of the types of integrity violations were for
example on ‘corruption’:
. Being offered bribes (money or favors) to do or neglect something while on
duty.
. Accepting bribes (money or favors) for delivering better service.
. Selling confidential information to external parties.
On ‘conflict of interest: gifts’:
. Accepting small gifts (525 euro) from shopkeepers or small businesses.
. Accepting gifts of more serious value (4 25 euro) from external parties.
. Accepting goods or services with discount from catering establishments or small
businesses while on duty.
And on private time misconduct they were:
. Excessive use of alcohol in private time.
. Use of party drugs in private time.
. Contact with criminals in private time.
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An example item for integrity violation frequency is: ‘In my opinion, theft of
organizational properties has occurred in the past year within my unit’ (0, never; 1,
once; 2, several times; 3, regularly; 4, often (weekly)). An example item for integrity
violation moral judgment (i.e. acceptability) is: ‘In my opinion, theft of organizational
properties within my unit is: 0, never acceptable; 1, seldom acceptable; 2, sometimes
acceptable; 3, mostly acceptable; 4, always acceptable.
Sample, procedure and response
To be able to validate the typology, a survey questionnaire was distributed within the
police force of Midden- and West Brabant (hereafter, the MWB), one of the larger
regional forces in the Netherlands. This force employs 2,720 individuals (as of 2003),
and is in terms of its problems, police tasks, and performance comparable to the
regional police forces of Amsterdam-Amstelland, Rotterdam-Rijnmond, Haaglanden,
and Utrecht, which are located in the most urban part of the Netherlands (including
cities like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague, and Utrecht).
The research was carried out with the full cooperation of the organization, which
facilitated distribution of the final questionnaire among all employees of the selected
force. The research population consisted of 2,700 employees, each of whom received a
letter from the Chief Commissioner requesting survey participation and emphasizing
the importance of the research. The letter explained the study purpose and guaranteed
respondent anonymity and confidentiality of information. Respondents were not
required to identify themselves on the questionnaire in any way and were given
assurance that no one from their organization would have access to individual
questionnaires. Respondents returned the completed questionnaires to the independent
researchers in a sealed envelope.
In total, 800 completed questionnaires were received, a response rate of almost 30
percent. Initial examination of these questionnaires for socially desirable response
patterns and full completion resulted in a total of 755 usable questionnaires that were
included in the dataset. Despite the rather low response, the match between the
respondent group and the research population was compared using background statistics
such as gender, ethnicity, age, and position,5 which, as Table 2 shows, did reveal minor
differences. The survey included questions about the direct supervisor and direct work
environment but nothing more about respondent background because the police
organization boards feared that such questions might make officers doubt the assurances
of response anonymity. Therefore, analysis on the basic unit level was not possible.
Reliability and preliminary validation
The data reduction and scale construction used factor and reliability analysis as analytical
techniques within the SPSS-package (see, for example, Carmines and Zeller 1979).
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First, an explorative principal component factor analysis was conducted on the
complete set of variables. After inspection of the rotated component matrix, the
variables were divided into subgroups and both an explorative and a final confirmative
principal component factor analysis was carried out. The last step was to conduct a
reliability analysis and build the final scales. The testing criteria for the scale were a
Cronbach’s alpha4 .60, average interitem correlations4 .30, and item-rest correla-
tions4 .20 (Kline 1986). Factor loadings had to be4 .30, and the difference between
the factor loadings of an item on two factors4 .20. Any item not meeting the criteria
was removed from the analysis unless there were serious theoretical considerations to
do otherwise (as described below).
To validate the integrity violation typology empirically, the sixty-four manifestations
of integrity violations included in the questionnaire were analyzed. Based on Robinson
and Bennett’s (1995: 565; Bennett and Robinson 2000: 350) observation that it is
necessary to concentrate on the ‘target of deviance’ (the qualitative dimension) rather
than the ‘severity of deviance’ (the quantitative dimension), validation of the typology
began with an initial factor analysis of acceptability designed to establish different
families of integrity violations. Further rationale for this choice is provided by the fact
that employee moral judgments of integrity violation acceptability represent the
qualitative dimension, while the observed frequency of integrity violations represents
the quantitative dimension. Thus, the factor and reliability analysis needed to validate
the theoretical conceptualization began with an explorative factor analysis on all sixty-
Table 2: Response distribution
Respondent group (%) Research population (%)
Gender
Male 72 73
Female 28 27
Ethnicity
Other than Dutch 5.0 3.5
Age
25 years or younger 9.1 7.9
26–35 years old 20.9 23.5
36–45 years old 34.4 33.4
46–55 years old 30.5 30.4
56 years and older 5.1 4.8
Position
Executive personnel 67.7 70.9
Administrative-technical (AT) 25.3 21.2
Aspirant 4.1 7.9
Different 2.9 0
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four items. Eighteen factors appeared in the rotated solution, most of which conformed
to expectations and were theoretically interpretable (see Lasthuizen 2008):
. Factor 1 reflects corruption: bribing and theft (types 1 and 3).
. Factor 2 reflects discrimination against colleagues (type 8).
. Factor 3 reflects private time misconduct (type 10).
. Factor 4 reflects conflict of interest through gifts (type 4).
. Factor 5 reflects waste and abuse, and fraud (types 9 and 2).
. Factor 6 reflects waste and abuse, and indecent treatment of colleagues (types 9
and 8).
. Factor 7 reflects improper use of authority (type 6).
. Factor 8 reflects corruption: favoritism (nepotism and cronyism) (type 2).
. Factor 9 reflects fraud (type 3).
. Factor 10 reflects forms of intimidation among colleagues and indecent treatment
of customers (type 8).
. Factor 11 reflects misuse and manipulation of information (type 7).
. Factor 12 reflects sexual harassment (type 8).
. Factor 13 reflects domestic violence (type 10).
. Factor 14 reflects corruption: favoritism by supervisors (type 2).
. Factor 15 reflects use of drugs on duty and falsifying police reports (types 9
and 7).
. Factor 16 reflects the disclosure of information to the media and theft of lost
properties (types 7 and 3).
. Factor 17 reflects conflict of interest through sideline activities (type 5).
. Factor 18 reflects use of alcohol on duty (type 9).
. Almost all factor loadings were4 .30.
. Not all factors are interpretable in terms of content or exist as single items
(factors 13, 15, 16, and 18).
. Some (theoretical) types of integrity violations are divided into more than one
factor (types 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9).
. Analysis of the cross-loadings shows some intermingling between manifestations
(or items) of waste and abuse and manifestations (or items) of indecent
treatment of colleagues and fraud. Theft of organizational properties also
coincides with bribing.
The next step was to select groups of variables for each type, although it should also
be noted that some types in fact consist of subtypes, for instance: type 3 fell into fraud
and into theft. Thus, an explorative factor analysis was carried out for each type in this
first classification, although to avoid ambiguous items with high cross-loadings, some
initial factors were omitted (factors 13, 15, 16, and 18). Even though these analyses did
lead to some changes in the initial factor analysis on all items, in the end only one factor
could be extracted for each (sub)type.
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The final step was a confirmatory analysis on the item subgroups; however, because
the goal was equal types (or families) for acceptability and observed frequency of
integrity violations, this analysis concentrated on the observed frequencies. This
attempt succeeded, which is theoretically important (as we argue in the next section),
although some small concessions were made to scale reliability as in the case of conflict
of interest through sideline activities (alphas of .51 and .54), misuse and manipulation
of information (one lower average interitem correlation of .23), and indecent treatment
of customers (one alpha of .37).
VALIDATED TYPOLOGY AND RESULTS
The analysis of the data resulted in a typology with fifteen empirically distinguishable
types of integrity violations. Relating these to the theoretical framework presented
before, the ten types can indeed be distinguished empirically, though some of them do
fall into several subtypes. Table 3 presents the resulting empirical typology. Appendix 1
shows the exact statistics for the subsequent scales and the items from the questionnaire
that were included (see also Lasthuizen 2008). Some interesting observations can be
made with regard to the empirically discerned integrity violations typology. For
favoritism (type 2) it is shown that organizational position matters: supervisors have an
authority position and their misuse of power to favor a third party (2a) is thus clearly
distinctive from favoritism by employees (2b). Also, fraud and theft are empirical
subtypes (3a and 3b). Indecent treatment falls apart in the empirical subtypes of
Table 3: Empirically discerned types of integrity violations
1. Corruption: bribing
2a. Corruption: favoritism by supervisors
2b. Corruption: favoritism by employees
3a. Fraud
3b. Theft
4. Conflict of interest through gifts
5. Conflict of interest through jobs
6. Improper use of authority
7. Misuse and manipulation of information
8a. Discrimination against colleagues
8b. Sexual harassment of colleagues
8c. Indecent treatment of colleagues
8d. Indecent treatment of citizens and customers
9. Waste and abuse of organizational resources
10. Private time misconduct
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discrimination (8a), sexual harassment (8b) and indecent treatment of colleagues (8c)
versus citizens and customers (8d).
This first success of the validation of the typology is theoretically important in that
Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) scales were limited to only the forms of employee
deviance found more commonly across organizational contexts and occupations. In
contrast, the typology developed here includes both the more serious and less common
forms of employee deviance (like corruption).
With this validation, we have made a first step in establishing which manifestations of
integrity violations empirically belong to which behavioral families (see Table 3); that
is, the clusters of deviant behaviors that have similar characteristics and similar
antecedents, which may be functional substitutes in that they serve the same goals
(Bennett and Robinson 2000: 349–50). Table 4 and Figure 1 present the outcomes for
the observed frequency and acceptability of the fifteen empirically discerned integrity
violations in the researched Dutch police force. The incidence and prevalence of
integrity violations (observed frequency) was assessed by asking respondents how often
they had observed specific integrity violations in their work unit over the last 12
months, while moral judgment (acceptability) was assessed by asking respondents to
indicate how acceptable they found these behaviors. In Table 4 the percentages are
included of those respondents that indicated that they have never observed the type of
integrity violations (second column: observed frequency) and judged them to be never
Table 4: Moral judgments on and observed frequency of integrity violations: descriptive results
Observed frequency Acceptability
Types of integrity violations Percentage of ‘never observed/acceptable’ (%)
1. Corruption: bribing 96 98
2a. Corruption: favoritism by supervisors 51 64
2b. Corruption: favoritism by employees 80 78
3a. Fraud 25 25
3b. Theft 82 96
4. Conflict of interest through gifts 72 60
5. Conflict of interest through jobs 83 57
6. Improper use of authority 78 83
7. Misuse and manipulation of information 84 89
8a. Discrimination against colleagues 85 96
8b. Sexual harassment of colleagues 92 99
8c. Indecent treatment of colleagues 54 72
8d. Indecent treatment of customers 58 80
9. Waste and abuse 60 85
10. Private time misconduct 73 71
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acceptable (third column: acceptability). In Figure 1 the mean scores of each of the
different types of integrity violations are given. These scores are based on the factors
and can be interpreted as follows: the higher the mean score – on a scale of 0 to 4 – the
more prevalent (observed frequency) or acceptable the manifestation of the integrity
violation will be throughout the organization.
As Table 4 and Figure 1 clearly demonstrate, both the observed frequency and the
acceptability of integrity violations vary across the different types. For instance, bribing
occurs rarely and is considered unacceptable by most employees; conversely, the
observed frequency of fraud is relatively high, but employees do not really view that
behavior as problematic as they find its occurrence rather acceptable. The general
pattern shows that the respondents did not perceive most types of integrity violations
as occurring frequently in the direct work environment and judged them to be
unacceptable practices. However, the responses also suggest that favoritism by
supervisors, fraud, indecent treatment of colleagues and customers, and waste and
abuse may be more widespread, an observation that, for fraud, coincides with a milder
moral judgment (i.e. fewer respondents find this violation unacceptable). As such, the
characteristics of types of violations provide important information for the development
of organizational integrity policies (see, for example, Lasthuizen et al. 2002, 2005;
Lasthuizen 2008). Although much more could be said about these results, the focus of
this article is to clarify the possibility of developing a more advanced method to
measure integrity violations. Therefore we limit ourselves in the next paragraph to a
brief illustration of one of the possible uses of the results in policy and theory
development.
Figure 1: Observed frequency versus acceptability of integrity violation types (mean scale scores; range 0,
low, to 4, high)
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ILLUSTRATION
The integrity violations typology (see Tables 1 and 3) presented in this article will
enable us to gain more insight into the differences and similarities between integrity
violations in terms of their respective antecedents and effects. Recent research by
Lasthuizen (2008) convincingly shows that the different types of integrity violations
presented in this article sometimes have vastly different underlying causal structures.
Specifically, Lasthuizen’s study reveals that the various types of integrity violations are
differently associated with leadership styles and elements of the organization’s ethical
culture. To illustrate (see Figure 2), conflict of interest through gifts seems to be a
rather straightforward matter, with role modeling and clarity of rules being the most
important factors affecting the moral judgments of employees, which in turn is the most
important influence factor for the observed frequency of gifts. In contrast, as
Lasthuizen’s study shows, the causal structure underlying discrimination against
colleagues is far more complex. In the latter case, specific features of an organization’s
ethical culture such as discussability, sanctionability (reinforcement), and supportability
Figure 2: AMOS models for conflict of interest
Note: In the AMOS models, exact paths of influence are identifiable for the type of integrity violation in question.
The arrows represent the effect of the independent and intermediate variables on the dependent variable, while
the numbers represent the effect size; only significant standardized betas are included. The models give an
overview of all influential factors, as well as the direct and indirect effects of the various (ethical) leadership styles
on the type of integrity violation under consideration. See Lasthuizen (2008) for the fifteen models for each
empirical type of integrity violations.
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(cf. Kaptein 2008) also influence judgments of the acceptability and the observed
frequency of this type of integrity violations. For each type of integrity violations a
model as presented in Figure 2 can be computed (see Lasthuizen 2008), which makes it
easy to derive what helps to protect the organizational integrity and how each type of
integrity violations might be addressed with a combination of leadership styles working
directly or indirectly by improving the ethical culture in the direct work environment
and enhancing the moral judgment of employees. Specifying the correlates of each of
the different types of integrity violations in such a way clearly informs existing theories
on organizational misconduct and ethics management and shows that those wishing to
pinpoint what works and what does not should concentrate on specific influential
relationships between specific organizational characteristics, such as leadership styles and
ethical culture dimensions, on the one hand and specific types of integrity violations on
the other.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The findings of this validation study support our argument that a broader approach to
studying and measuring integrity violations will advance our understanding of unethical
behavior and misconduct. The varying levels of observed frequency and acceptability of
the types of integrity violations suggest that they indeed represent different phenomena
– both in quantitative and in qualitative terms. Thus, confining them to umbrella terms
as ‘corruption’ or ‘unethical behavior’ seems to be a gross oversimplification and does
not do justice to the diversity and complexity underlying integrity violations.
Moreover, the results imply that evaluation of the integrity or corruptness of an actor is
indeed more complex than merely labeling one ‘corrupt’ or ‘not corrupt’, ‘ethical’ or
‘unethical’. A certain level of differentiation in types of integrity violations seems
quintessential for several reasons. It enhances our understanding of the phenomenon, it
helps in passing nuanced moral judgment on the individual or organization in question,
and it allows for more specific recommendations to improve organizational integrity
policies and ethics management. For instance, a logical next step would be to develop
effective research instruments for specific integrity violations. Indeed, if we truly wish
to develop ethical governance, we need to broaden, sharpen and deepen our
conceptualizations and measurements of the ethical norms that we set and the unethical
behavior that we aim to prevent.
Obviously, we acknowledge that there are limitations to our study and attempt to
validate a typology of integrity violations. The research was done within the Dutch
police, which will have influenced the results. Another issue to reflect upon is the
selection of manifestations of unethical behavior we used to characterize the integrity
violations. Although this case study was chosen as the most appropriate means for
assessing whether a general integrity model could be drafted, it would be worthwhile to
survey other types of organizations, also in other countries to try to find out whether
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the resulting typology of integrity violations and its specific manifestations is valid in
other contexts as well. To encourage other researchers to do so, the questionnaire (see
Appendix 1) is available for scientific use and can be obtained from the authors on
request. Obviously, a logical expansion of this approach would be to perform similar
analyses in other public sectors; for instance, in municipalities (cf. Kearney 2008) or
central government agencies. It would also be interesting to conduct research within
the private sector and hybrid organizations, not only because the organizational goals
might be completely different but because, for example, the underlying value structures
might also differ (cf. van der Wal 2008; van der Wal et al. 2008; Heres 2010). Finally,
it is crucial to move beyond geographical and cultural borders and conduct similar
research worldwide (cf. House et al. 2002; Resick et al. 2006), because comparing the
estimated models in several organizations and sectors and within different nations and
cultures would enable the major step forward of determining the critical contextual
factors. The type of quantitative research used in the present study seems very useful in
this respect, though the potential of qualitative research to map out contextual factors
should not be overlooked either (cf. Bryman et al. 1996).
Either way, what we hope to have illustrated here is that progressing toward a more
refined and detailed instrument to measure the frequency as well as the acceptability
integrity violations seems to be a realistic, promising, and worthwhile endeavor.
NOTES
1 See, for instance, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ExecutiveOrder-EthicsCommitments/.
2 See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table
3 It is seen as ‘wholeness’, as being consistent and coherent in principles and values (Montefiori 1999), possibly
as professional wholeness or responsibility (‘You do what you are expected to do as a professional and you
stand for what you are doing’; Karssing 2001: 3; van Luijk 2004). Because this interpretation lacks the moral
dimension or moral filter (Brenkert 2004: 4), others prefer bringing in right and wrong. Some see integrity as
one specific basic value, usually meaning incorruptibility or righteousness. Others see integrity more as an
umbrella concept, combining sets of values that are relevant for the functionary that is judged. One view is the
legal or constitutional one with bureaucrats’ ethical obligation to respond to constitutional or regime values
(Rohr 1989: 4–5). Because the law is not a very clear guiding principle in actual government and governance,
a broader interpretation in terms of ‘complying with the moral values and norms’ is by others seen as more
appropriate (Uhr 1999; Thomas 2001; Fijnaut and Huberts 2002). This of course comes close to ‘a general
way of acting morally’ and ‘morality’ (Brenkert 2004: 5). A last view stresses that integrity is something to
strive for. Van Luijk (2004: 39) stated: ‘Integrity now stands for complying in an exemplary way with specific
moral standards.’
4 The findings for the police are reported in two articles by Kaptein and van Reenen (2001; van Reenen and
Kaptein 1998). The secondary analysis of all police data (netto number¼ 3,125) is reported in several articles
by Kaptein, Lasthuizen, and Huberts (i.e. Lasthuizen et al. 2002, 2005; Huberts et al. 2007).
5 Based on Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2004) [Ministry of Interior],
Kerngegevens Nederlandse Politie 2003 [Core Data: Dutch Police Force 2003], in 2003 the MWB had
2,674 full-time equivalent (FTE) executive and administrative-technical (AT) employees (these data exclude
candidate police officers).
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Appendix 1: aaaa
Item # Types of integrity violations Factor
loadi ngsa
Item-rest
correlationa
1. Corruption: bribing A F A F
III.04b Accepting bribes (money or favors) to do or neglect
something while on duty
.78 .79 .53 .60
III.05b Being offered bribes (money or favors) to do or
neglect something while on duty
.91 .79 .72 .59
III.06b Accepting bribes (money or favors) for delivering
better service
.63 .72 .43 .53
III.07b Selling confidential information to external parties .90 .81 .71 .59
4 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 66%; a¼ .73; item M¼ 0.03; SD¼ .19; average inter-item correlation¼ .53
F: R2¼ 60%; a¼ .75; item M¼ 0.06; SD¼ .24; average inter-item correlation¼ .46
2a. Corruption: favoritism by supervisors
III.01 Favoritism by superiors
1 item in final scale
A: item M¼ 0.52; SD¼ 0.81; F: item M¼ 0.97; SD¼ 1.13
2b. Corruption: favoritism by employees A F A F
III.03 Favoring of friends or family outside the organization .63 .55 .38 .33
III.14 Asking a colleague to undo a ticket given to a family
member
.71 .63 .46 .36
III.34 Consulting confidential police files for former
colleagues
.72 .77 .43 .48
III.35 Consulting confidential police files for friends or
family outside the organization
.77 .79 .49 .48
4 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 50%; a¼ .64; item M¼ 0.31; SD¼ 0.44; average inter-item correlation¼ .33
F: R2¼ 48%; a¼ .62; item M¼ 0.29; SD¼ 0.45; average inter-item correlation¼ .51
3a. Fraud A F A F
III.08 Use of organizational resources for private purposes .80 .82 .51 .58
III.10 Use of working hours for private purposes .83 .84 .55 .61
III.12 Use of the Internet, e-mail, or telephone for private
purposes
.71 .78 .42 .53
3 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 61%; a¼ .68; item M¼ 1.31; SD¼ 0.71; average inter-item correlation¼ .41
F: R2¼ 66%; a¼ .75; item M¼ 1.53; SD¼ 0.85; average inter-item correlation¼ .50
(continued)
Appendix 1
Final scales for the empirically discerned types of integrity violations
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3b. Theft
III.09 Theft of organizational properties
1 item in final scale
A: item M¼ 0.05; SD¼ 0.26; F: item M¼ 0.30; SD¼ 0.71
4. Conflict of interest through gifts A F A F
III.16 Accepting small gifts (525 euro) from grateful
civilians
.80 .78 .63 .57
III.17 Accepting small gifts (525 euro) from shopkeepers
or businesses
.89 .85 .76 .67
III.18 Accepting gifts of more serious value (4 25 euro)
from external parties
.78 .66 .60 .44
III.19 Accepting goods or services with discount from
catering establishments or businesses while on
duty
.66 .63 .46 .40
4 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 62%; a¼ .78; item M¼ 0.75; SD¼ 0.76; average inter-item correlation¼ .49
F: R2¼ 54%; a¼ .71; item M¼ 0.47; SD¼ 0.58; average inter-item correlation¼ .39
5. Conflict of interest through jobs A F A F
III.21 Working in private time as a security guard .79 .78 .45 .42
III.22 Working in private time as a security consultant in
one’s own neighbourhood
.75 .78 .41 .39
III.23 Sideline activities or jobs that might pose a conflict of
interest
.65 .59 .30 .26
3 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 54%; a¼ .54; item M¼ 0.95; SD¼ 0.75; average inter-item correlation¼ .31
F: R2¼ 52%; a¼ .51; item M¼ 0.25; SD¼ 0.43; average inter-item correlation¼ .29
6. Improper use of authority A F A F
III.24 Use of improper and/or disproportional violence .78 .85 .48 .64
III.25 Incorrect care of suspects and prisoners .82 .83 .55 .61
III.26 Use of illegal investigational methods .74 .75 .45 .51
3 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 61%; a¼ .67; item M¼ 0.22; SD¼ 0.43; average inter-item correlation¼ .50
F: R2¼ 66%; a¼ .75; item M¼ 0.33; SD¼ 0.56; average inter-item correlation¼ .42
7. Misuse and manipulation of information A F A F
III.28 Stretching the truth about the facts of a case .55 .73 .31 .52
III.30 Concealing information from the supervisory
authorities
.71 .73 .41 .50
III.32 Unauthorized use of a colleague’s password or access
code
.59 .51 .32 .32
III.33 Violation of secrecy rules .70 .70 .42 .46
III.37 Accidentally disclosing information to criminals .52 .62 .27 .37
(continued)
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5 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 38%; a¼ .57; item M¼ 0.14; SD¼ 0.27; average inter-item correlation¼ .23
F: R2¼ 44%; a¼ .66; item M¼ 0.22; SD¼ 0.37; average inter-item correlation¼ .30
8a. Discrimination against colleagues A F A F
III.38 Racial discrimination against colleagues .85 .89 .67 .76
III.39 Gender discrimination against colleagues .88 .89 .72 .74
III.40 Discrimination based on sexual orientation against
colleagues
.91 .89 .77 .77
3 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 77%; a¼ .85; item M¼ 0.05; SD¼ 0.22; average inter-item correlation¼ .66
F: R2¼ 79%; a¼ .87; item M¼ 0.24; SD¼ 0.57; average inter-item correlation¼ .70
8b. Sexual harassment of colleagues A F A F
III.43 Unwanted sexual physical contact .90 .89 .60 .58
III.44 Sexual harassment .90 .89 .60 .58
2 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 80%; a¼ .74; item M¼ 0.02; SD¼ 0.12; average inter-item correlation¼ .60
F: R2¼ 79%; a¼ .73; item M¼ 0.12; SD¼ 0.37; average inter-item correlation¼ .58
8c. Indecent treatment of colleagues A F A F
III.41 Bullying (e.g. teasing, ignoring, or isolating) .65 .72 .33 .43
III.42 Dubious compliments about appearance or clothing .80 .84 .49 .59
III.47 Racist jokes or insinuations .79 .80 .48 .53
3 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 56%; a¼ .60; item M¼ 0.40; SD¼ 0.53; average inter-item correlation¼ .34
F: R2¼ 62%; a¼ .70; item M¼ 0.81; SD¼ 0.79; average inter-item correlation¼ .51
8d. Indecent treatment of customers A F A F
III.48 Discriminating remarks to citizens or suspects and
prisoners
.81 .87 .32 .53
III.49 Offensive language to customers .81 .87 .32 .53
2 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 66%; a¼ .47; item M¼ 0.27; SD¼ 0.46; average inter-item correlation¼ .32
F: R2¼ 76%; a¼ .68; item M¼ 0.68; SD¼ 0.77; average inter-item correlation¼ .53
9. Waste and abuse A F A F
III.11 Unjustified billing of work hours/cheating on time
sheets
.61 .70 .40 .53
III.13 Incorrect handling of expense claims .65 .58 .47 .43
III.51 Falsely reporting in sick .74 .74 .55 .59
III.53 Minimal effort by employees (laziness) .63 .73 .46 .58
III.31 Careless handling of confidential police information .65 .70 .47 .56
III.56 Careless use of organizational properties .68 .76 .51 .62
6 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 44%; a¼ .72; item M¼ 0.18; SD¼ 0.29; average inter-item correlation¼ .33
F: R2¼ 50%; a¼ .79; item M¼ 0.71; SD¼ 0.66; average inter-item correlation¼ .39
(continued)
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10. Private time misconduct A F A F
III.57 Setting a bad example in private time .67 .71 .51 .58
III.58 Excessive use of alcohol in private time .74 .76 .56 .63
III.59 Use of soft drugs in private time .82 .83 .64 .63
III.60 Use of party drugs in private time .73 .78 .53 .56
III.64 Contact with criminals in private time .59 .56 .38 .40
5 items in final scale
A: R2¼ 51%; a¼ .75; item M¼ 0.47; SD¼ 0.59; average inter-item correlation¼ .37
F: R2¼ 54%; a¼ .76; item M¼ 0.45; SD¼ 0.56; average inter-item correlation¼ .42
Note: aA¼ acceptability; F¼ observed frequency.
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